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Inquiry, Relevance, Rules of 
Exclusion, and Evidentiary Reform 
D. Michael Risinger† 
We are metaphorically assembled in this volume in 
celebration of the career of Margaret Berger, whose ideas on 
evidence and proof have enriched all of our work. Throughout 
her career, she has been concerned with both the theoretical 
and practical aspects of our enterprise as scholars. In such a 
setting, I hope that a reverie on fundamentals, followed by a 
modest call for reform, will not be looked upon as out of place.  
It seems to me that there are some foundational issues 
in regard to the very notions of relevance and of rules of 
exclusion that can profitably be reexamined. First, I will 
assume that the issue of “exclusion” of information will arise in 
the context of an inquiry, that is, some human activity 
undertaken to at least attempt a determination about an issue 
for which the answer is initially unknown. Second, I will 
assume that the issue involved is often (but not always) 
properly characterized as an issue of fact in its most basic 
sense, that is, a question the answer to which will be a 
proposition about a specific empirically determinable1 state of 
the world (assumed to be) exterior to human consciousness. It 
is to such issues I will confine myself, at least initially. 
In any situation fitting this description there will be a 
human inquirer who, at the beginning of the process, is in a 
poor state of knowledge, that is, the inquirer’s state of available 
  
 † John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. An 
early version of this paper was presented at the Miniforo on Legal Epistemology 
organized by Larry Laudan and held at the National University of Mexico in June, 
2008. I would like to thank Professor Laudan for inviting these reflections, and the 
participants in the Miniforo on Legal Epistemology, particularly Ronald Allen and Erik 
Lillquist, for stimulating further reflections. I would also like to thank Craig Callen, 
Dale Nance, Roger Park, Charles Sullivan and Peter Tillers for very helpful comments 
on drafts of this paper, and Lesley C. Risinger for the usual indispensible aid, 
substantive and editorial. 
 1 By using the word “determinable” I do not mean to commit myself to any 
strong claims about the perfection of knowledge, as will become obvious from the rest of 
the paper. 
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information is such that a finding2 concerning the fact in issue 
would not be well-warranted. The point of the process is to 
enable the inquirer to have the information necessary either to 
make a properly warranted finding, or to conclude that such a 
finding would not be properly warranted based on the 
information obtained through the process.3  
So far, we have not imposed any constraints upon the 
process involved, beyond whatever is implied by the word 
“process.” The process could be time-bound, or not. The process 
could involve a single inquirer or a group. The process could 
require the declaration of a conclusion, or not. The process 
could authorize the inquirers to obtain information 
(investigate) themselves, or disable inquirers from so doing, in 
whole or in part, after the process begins (thus splitting the 
decisional aspects of an inquiry from the investigative 
function). Such latter process would require or authorize 
investigation by non-decisionmakers, with an eye to potentially 
providing the results of such investigation to the 
decisionmaker, whether or not the decisionmaker could also 
investigate independently of others. It could allow some forms 
of investigation but not others, or rule out of bounds some 
forms of information.  
This “ruling out of bounds” is the essence of an 
exclusionary rule. It is in the context of an inquiry involving a 
split between investigation and decision agents where we are 
most used to seeing exclusionary rules advanced or attacked, 
but the notion of an exclusionary rule is not theoretically 
limited to this context. Of course there might be practical 
constraints on inquirers making good faith efforts to follow 
mandated exclusions in a unitary function inquiry. Indeed, in 
the legal context, it is sometimes said that exclusionary rules 
in unitary systems make no sense because judges must look at 
the evidence to determine if they should not see it.4 But this 
goes too far. They need not look at the content under all forms 
of exclusionary rule. Sometimes they can merely look at the 
package. A rule directing a judge to “consider nothing in 
writing” would not necessarily expose a judge to any 
  
 2 I use the word “finding” and “determination” interchangeably. 
 3 The issue concerning how much information is enough for a properly 
warranted finding in any given inquiry is a policy issue concerning the proper standard 
of proof, to use the legal term. In many non-legal settings each individual may be free 
to adopt whatever standard seems appropriate to them. 
 4 See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 47 (1997). 
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information beyond the fact that a writing exists, before the 
judge put the writing out of sight and out of consideration. Of 
course, most proposed exclusionary rules are not like this, but 
it is important to keep in mind that whether an inquirer is 
exposed to proscribed information in the process of determining 
its proscribed status falls along a continuum ranging from the 
necessity of full exposure to a situation where very little 
exposure is required, depending on the nature of the rule. 
Which brings us to the question of what a “free proof” 
process of inquiry without any exclusionary rules whatsoever 
would look like.5 I take as my model of such a process an 
inquiry by an individual into whether, say, other humans had 
advance knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald’s intention to take 
his Mannlicher Carcano rifle to work and attempt a shot at 
John Kennedy from the 6th floor window of the Texas School 
Book Depository on November 22, 1963.6 From the perspective 
of this notional inquirer, the notion of pure free proof makes 
sense. The inquirer is totally free to consider whatever the 
inquirer believes to be information bearing on the inquiry, to 
take as much time as necessary to come to a conclusion, to 
come to no conclusion, or to any conclusion whatsoever, to any 
degree of certainty that results from the process and the 
  
 5 I am here using the term “free proof” in what is probably its most 
commonly assumed meaning in English, that is, in its strongest sense, the complete 
absence of any rules of exclusion, and in a weaker sense, the absence of all rules of 
exclusion except irrelevance. Deirdre Dwyer traces this use of the term to Thayer. See 
Deirdre M. Dwyer, What Does It Mean To Be Free? The Concept of “Free Proof” in the 
Western Legal Tradition, 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol3/iss1/art6/. The other dominant meaning of 
the term refers to the unconstrained freedom of the factfinder to evaluate what is in 
front of the factfinder in any way that seems best, unconstrained by any other 
arrangements such as rules of fixed evaluation (corroboration, “half-proof” etc.), 
presumptions, authoritative comments on inferential strength, whether mandated or 
simply authorized, etc. I would prefer to call the latter “free inference.” (And, in fact, 
this is better in line with post-revolutionary French terms that are the source concepts, 
liberté des preuves for the first and liberté d’appreciation for the second. See id. at 7.) 
“Free proof” in these terms thus concentrates in a legal context on the provision of 
information (or asserted information) and “free inference” on the use of whatever 
information is provided, so that free proof describes the freedom to proffer, and free 
inference the freedom to evaluate what is proffered in any way that seems appropriate, 
given the task to be undertaken by the factfinder (which in a legal setting would still 
be defined by the substantive law through instructions). A further step, which might be 
said to prevail in an extreme system of equity discretion, might be called “free decision” 
(and might encompass such things as jury nullification), but that is way beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 6 For purposes of this little reflection, I am assuming (perhaps 
counterfactually) that there is no reasonable controversy that Oswald did take his rifle 
to work with an intent to take a shot at President Kennedy from the 6th floor of the 
Texas Schoolbook Depository building on November 22, 1963. 
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information discovered and considered. If the inquirer takes 
ouiji board7 pronouncements as authoritative (relevant, 
strongly probative) there’s no law (or a priori rule) against it.  
If, on the other hand, the individual wishes to persuade 
others of any conclusion reached, the individual would be well-
advised to take into account the epistemic investments of the 
target audience, because what the individual regards as 
providing a strong warrant for the conclusion may not be so 
taken by others. In that case, when the individual sets out to 
persuade, or to provide a warrant seen as acceptable to the 
audience, the audience may in practical terms impose a rule of 
exclusion on the one seeking to persuade: no reference to ouiji 
board results should be given, tendered, proffered, presented or 
suggested.  
Well, you might say, that would not be a systemic rule, 
really, but a rule of persuasive or rhetorical prudence. And so it 
would be, if the context involved were merely history as a 
hobby, or a free intellectual pursuit. But now assume some 
official action, which will benefit some and be a cost to others, 
is made to turn on the results of the inquiry. Now there is more 
at stake than merely personal investments (for one thing, the 
newly imposed functional conditions require some time limits 
for decision). It would seem that now there must be an officially 
declared criterion of some sort concerning what is in bounds, 
and what is out of bounds, as providing material for an 
acceptable belief warrant. This circumstance is heightened in 
any such process (which by definition involves conflicting 
interests) in which representatives of the conflicting interests 
are allowed to proffer information to the inquirer. Real free 
proof would permit the destruction of functionally required 
time constraints by filibuster, and in many cases one side 
would have an incentive to undertake such a strategy.8 
  
 7 Otherwise known as a channeling board, spirit board, or talking board. I 
have adopted the popular spelling “ouiji” (also sometimes spelled “weegee”), which 
reflects the common pronunciation, in preference to the original spelling “Ouija,” which 
is trademarked. 
 8 A similar observation was made in that classic of modern legal relevance 
theory, George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 701 
(1941). The James article is justly famous, being cited as a source for the approach of 
FRE 401 in its Advisory Committee note, FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note, 
among other things, and at 17 pages is one of the shortest law review articles of lasting 
theoretical impact in the modern era. This is especially striking, considering the fact 
that James was predominately a tax/estates and trusts practitioner who was only in 
the academy (as an assistant professor at the University of Chicago) for less than five 
years in his mid-30s, and that he only wrote two articles on evidence topics (out of 11 
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Nor is it a simple solution to this problem to invoke the 
concept of relevance as the sole criterion to be applied to items 
claimed to be properly considered as “information” in such a 
context, because relevance is a much more problematic concept 
than most people realize. I think there are generally two 
contrasting ways to approach the notion of relevance, which I 
will call the “god perspective” and the “processor state 
perspective.” From the god perspective, there is no limit to the 
concept of relevance. Even if we conceive of a god-being who is 
not in some sense omniscient to begin with, the minimum 
assumption of the god perspective is that the god inference 
maker knows all that is necessary to make as much accurate 
inference as possible from any given item proposed for 
consideration, and has no time or processing capacity 
constraints.9 In such a circumstance, there is no obvious 
stopping point between any piece of factual information and all 
the facts that can be—the Laplacian hyper-inference grok.10 
Everything becomes relevant to everything in a virtually 
tautological sense,11 or at least there is no knock-down reason to 
believe it doesn’t.12 So the god perspective on inference is, for 
  
total, many of which were tax articles written after he returned to practice.) (Searching 
his name as author in the Hein-on-Line journals database will confirm this.) 
 9 “Laplace probably had God in mind as the powerful intelligence to whose 
gaze the whole future is open. See infra note 11. If not, he should have: 19th and 20th 
century mathematical studies have shown convincingly that neither a finite, nor an 
infinite but embedded-in-the-world intelligence can have the computing power 
necessary to predict the actual future, in any world remotely like ours.” Carl Hoefer, 
“Causal Determinism,” STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ONLINE, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/. 
 10 The word “grok,” signifying an immediate and perfect knowledge of one 
thing derived from another (often empathetic subjective states between two 
individuals) was coined by Robert A. Heinlein in his book STRANGER IN A STRANGE 
LAND, but it has now made it into the OED.  
 11 Consider this from Laplace: 
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past 
and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would 
know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of 
which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit 
these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of 
the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an 
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would 
be present before its eyes.  
PIERRE-SIMON LAPLACE, ESSAI PHILOSOPHIQUE SUR LES PROBABILITÉS (1814).  
 12 Laplacian “lockstep” determinism (also called causal, nomological, or hard 
determinism) is a member of a family of philosophical problems (radical skepticism and 
others) which are difficult or impossible to refute completely, but which virtually 
nobody believes, at least in any operational sense. (For a recent examination of various 
forms of determinism in light of the “determinism/free will” debate, see generally 
DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003)). Perhaps needless to say, I do not 
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any pragmatic human use (including use as a limitation on 
filibuster), worthless,13 yet it is the stance that seems to be 
assumed in many legal rules and discussions of inference,14 
particularly rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 401.  
  
embrace Laplacian determinism, but I believe the mental experiment in the text which 
assumes it is instructive nonetheless.  
 13 Another conceptual problem avoided by rejecting the god view is the 
problem of what has been called “unknown relevance,” that is, evidence that is 
“relevant” but whose “probative value [is] entirely unknown, at least to an ordinary 
reasonable trier of fact.” Dale Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. 
REV. 447, 456 n.30 (1990); see also Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 1021, 1029-30 (1977). In my view, such proffers, while perhaps potentially 
relevant under other conditions, are simply “irrelevant” in any meaningful sense. This 
can be an especial problem when legislatures, for whatever reason, attempt to declare 
information categorically admissible when the covering generality connecting the 
evidence to the desired conclusion would be in many or most cases unknown to judge 
and jury alike, as in the case of the presumption of importation of marijuana from the 
mere fact that a seized substance was identified as marijuana, which was one subject of 
examination in United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). See Harold A. Ashford and D. 
Michael Risinger, Assumptions, Presumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A 
Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L. J. 165, 205-08 (1969). 
 14 This approach is sometimes referred to as the theory of “logical relevance” 
(though why it is thought to be more “logical” than other approaches is not entirely 
clear) and sometimes as the theory of “minimal relevance.” Professor Callen attributes 
its initial explicit exposition to Professor George James, and the “minimal relevance” 
terminology to Professor Tillers. See Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: 
Conditional Relevancy and Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1254 
n.51, 1280 n.182 (2003). The limitlessness of “minimal relevance,” that is, relevance 
when viewed as a quality of the relationship between a probans and a probandum in 
the abstract, has been noted before, most specifically by Jerome Michael and Mortimer 
Adler: “If the criterion of admissibility were simply relevancy, in the strict logical 
sense . . . [then] nothing would be inadmissible since, as we have seen, nothing would 
be irrelevant in that sense.” Jerome Michael & Mortimer Adler, The Trial of an Issue of 
Fact: II, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1462, 1462 (1934). See the discussion in PETER TILLERS, 
REVISER’S NOTE, § 37.3, IA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1027-28 (Tillers rev. 1983) 
[hereinafter TILLERS]. This limitlessness is mainly a product of two things: the first is 
the likelihood that rational inference is best formally modeled by a structure where a 
probans is related to a probandum by the “nomological glue” (to use Professor Tillers’s 
term) of a covering generality of some sort. The second is the fact that the identity and 
extent of such covering generalities in the universe is currently unknown (and, given a 
variety of constraints flowing from the human condition, in principle unknowable), so 
that the relevance of any probans to any probandum can never be said with certainty 
not to exist as a function of a covering generality not currently known. The best 
illustration of this inescapable problem that I am aware of comes from Professor Callen 
(discussing it in the context of “conditional relevance”):  
There are some situations in which our limited knowledge and cognitive 
resources make relevancy of evidence conditional on information about 
additional facts—regardless of whether we have a doctrine called conditional 
relevancy. Suppose that D is accused of committing homicide by shooting. No 
bullet has been recovered, nor did police find any trace of one at the scene of 
the crime other than the wound. Evidence is offered that D used a number of 
extremely cold substances in his laboratory research. On its face, that 
evidence would be irrelevant to most people. That is, it seems unlikely that 
there is any connection between murder by shooting, absence of a bullet, and 
experience with extremely cold substances such as liquid nitrogen. If, on the 
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The alternative notion of relevance takes into account 
not only the information being proffered as relevant to some 
other claimed fact, but also the characteristics of the processor 
that will mediate between the initial information and the 
asserted inference.15 
Here we need to consider what we mean by 
“information.” Information is something that interacts with a 
decisionmaker (processor), broadly defined, which increases the 
rational warrant for some decision or group of decisions over 
potential rivals. Again, in approaching the concept of 
information in this way, I am emphasizing that the status of a 
stimulus as “information” is not inherent solely in the 
stimulus. It is dependent upon the way the stimulus interacts 
with the decisionmaker. Thus, whether a stimulus counts as 
information is a characterization of its interaction with and 
effect on a decisionmaker. No decisionmaker, no information, 
although things in the world that are stimuli that potentially 
could affect some decisionmaker under conditions not now 
prevailing might be called “potential” information.16 Not only 
does the status of something as information depend on its 
interaction with a decisionmaker, it must interact in a specified 
  
other hand, there were reason to believe that (i) one could shape some such 
frozen gas to form a bullet, (ii) fire it from an air gun causing a fatal wound, 
after which (iii) it would sublimate, then that would make D’s access to such 
substances relevant. Admitting all proffered evidence on the theory that some 
fact making it relevant might turn up would be incredibly wasteful.  
Callen, supra, at 1278-79. 
 15 The Federal Rules of Evidence move all processor considerations to Rule 
403, which I believe leaves almost nothing for Rule 401 to do on its own, at least if 
applied as drafted. I am not the first to make this observation. See TILLERS, supra note 
14, at § 37.2. (“[T]here are very few cases in which the exclusion of evidence can be 
explained on the ground of irrelevance alone. This ironic result is the product of the 
constricted exclusionary force of the legal principle of relevancy that arises from the 
assumption that the only legally irrelevant evidence is that evidence that also happens 
to be ‘logically’ irrelevant.” Id. at 1021.)  
 16 This definition of information proper, as distinguished from “potential 
information,” was first suggested, sub nom. “actual relevance” and “potential 
relevance” in D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and 
“Legitimate Moral Force,” Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 
HASTINGS L. J. 403, 431-35 (1998). It differs from the definition of “information” used 
in communication theory, where information is defined so broadly as to include both 
what is here referred to as information proper, and also what is referred to as 
“potential information.” See Warren Weaver, “Recent Contributions to the 
Mathematical Theory of Communication,” in CLAUDE SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, 
THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949): “The word information in this 
theory is used in a special sense that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In 
particular information must not be confused with meaning.” Id. at 8. 
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way. To count as information, it must both affect a decision, 
and affect it in an accuracy-improving way.  
By accuracy-improving, I mean that the stimulus must 
reliably be the kind of stimulus that improves the likelihood of 
the correspondence of a decision with the characteristics of the 
exterior world (again, we are limiting ourselves to decisions 
about facts, or to the fact component of more complex fact-value 
decisions). By defining information in this way I realize that I 
am making some fundamental commitments: first, to some 
version of a theory of knowledge that has both probabilistic and 
correspondence aspects; and second, to the proposition that 
whether a stimulus is information depends both, and as much, 
on the state of the decisionmaker as on the state of the 
stimulus. I will not attempt a full-scale defense of the first 
here, since I think that such an approach to knowledge is 
inherent in most contexts (for instance, legal contexts) to which 
I will apply the approach. The second requires both more 
unpacking of its implications, and more defense.  
One of the implications of a Laplacian determinist 
account would be that, from the perspective of a being that 
knew all the details of what was taken (by Laplace) to be a 
fully specified formal system (and perhaps more), there is no 
information in the sense I have defined it. As previously noted, 
every stimulus entails immediate complete knowledge of all 
other details of the system at all possible times past and 
present. I will not burden the reader with a rehearsal of the 
many problems of adopting this view as one that defines the 
nature of some ultimate physical reality.17 But the mental 
experiment entailed in considering this view results in one 
important point. “Decisions” about states of the world can only 
exist and be “informed” by “information” exactly because we 
live in a world of imperfect knowledge where virtually 
everything must be approached based on a probabilistic 
evaluation of the interaction of stimuli we receive acting upon 
the current states of our neural processors (that is, our 
reactions to those stimuli, conscious, semi-conscious or 
unconscious).  
Something that is information in regard to a particular 
issue is relevant to that issue. Something that is not 
information is not relevant. If something is information it is 
therefore evidence in the core sense, that is, it will affect the 
  
 17 See supra note 9. 
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processor (decisionmaker) in a way that is a net benefit to 
probabilistically better results, based on a pertinent evaluation 
of the information (about which more later) Therefore, whether 
something is relevant to a decision can only be determined by 
knowledge or assumption concerning the characteristics of that 
which is proffered (something claimed to be “evidence,” i.e. 
relevant information) and the characteristics of the 
decisionmaker, and the interrelationship between the two. 
Consider this: a dog is caught on a ledge. He is skittish. 
He may perform an act injurious to himself. Does this dog 
make a decision when he moves? Assuming the answer is in 
some sense yes, what stimulus could I give him that would 
count as information relevant to his decision? Words in English 
explaining the effects of falls from heights, or the value of 
remaining calm, or the safest route off the ledge? If not, then 
this illustrates the difference between potentially and usably 
relevant information,18 and how the two are a function of both 
the stimulus and the state of the putative decisionmaker.19  
So something is usably (as opposed to potentially) 
relevant information to a decision (that is, only then can it be 
counted as information at all) only in regard to the 
characteristics of the processer—is it the kind of information 
that raises the likelihood of decisions that conform to exterior 
empirical reality? I am not here making any claim about what 
the characteristics of an ideal processor might be.20 The 
  
 18 Or, one might say more accurately, between stimuli that are candidates to 
be considered information under different conditions than those currently prevailing, 
and those that actually are information. 
 19 But if I hold out a steak to lure the dog off the ledge, have I in any sense 
given him information that informs his decision about the problem of the ledge? 
Whatever drives are behind his action, and however we might move away from purely 
behavioral accounts to hypothesize an internal processing that might count as a 
decision about the steak, his response would not seem, at least at first blush, to 
represent a solution to the problem of deciding about ledge choices (except perhaps by 
assuming some connection between approaching humans holding steak and something 
counting as general trust).  
 20 Well, only very weak claims. It would seem that a stimulus that caused a 
response that induced an action for reasons unrelated to the pending problem, as might 
be the case in the dog example in note 19 supra, would not count as information even 
though it caused something that might be labeled a decision that resolved the problem. 
The steak resolved the problem, but not by providing an answer to an inquiry. Beyond 
that, as Professor Tillers has warned us for years, it is incumbent on us not to confuse 
our (current) models of ideal “rational” decision (which in themselves may turn out to 
be less than ideal) with the way humans process information or make optimal decisions 
about facts. See TILLERS, supra note 14, at 1017; see also Peter Tillers, Are There 
Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference? Of Inference Networks and Onto-
Epistemology, in JOHN JACKSON, MAXIMO LANGER & PETER TILLERS, EDS., CRIME, 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS 
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processor that counts is the processor we are ultimately stuck 
with, that is, humans en grosse. So if humans do not conform to 
an ideal processor, being just what they are and representing 
the range that they do in terms of the range of neural processor 
space and speed, prior experiences and heuristics, etc., then 
rules of admission (and a fortiori, rules of exclusion) must be 
fashioned with the best available information about these 
characteristics in mind, and more such information should be 
developed and considered for the improvement of that process 
of decision.  
Nothing I have said thus far is necessarily particularly 
novel, of course.21 It is consistent with general notions 
  
IN HONOR OF MIRJAN DAMASKA (2008). This is not to say that anything goes, or that 
human mental processors can be neither criticized nor trained to be more accurate in 
evaluation, but only that our natural modes, appropriately disciplined, may have 
epistemic advantages over currently available theoretical models. See Callen, supra 
note 14, at 1258-78. It seems to me that Daniel Dennett is right to say that whatever 
thinking (especially inferential thinking) is, it is virtually certain to be some sort of 
computational process—not one mimicking our current notions of ideal computation 
perhaps, but rather one that maximizes the trade-off between computational accuracy 
and efficiency through the use of modules, heuristics, and hierarchical selection of 
preliminary results. See generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 
(1991), particularly ch. 9, “The Architecture of the Human Mind,” at 253-82. It seems 
also very likely that some of its heuristics are hard-wired, some come more-or-less 
default wired subject to revision, while others really are the product of experience 
repeated and internalized. These processes provide the generalities necessary to make 
sense out of case-specific evidence, see WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: 
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 332-40 (2d ed. 2006), and create the implied reference classes 
that make the problem of relevance not a purely logical exercise even after the 
elimination of the god view. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The 
Problem of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007). 
  It also seems reasonably clear that some of our processing structures, 
heuristic, analogical and story-influenced as they appear to be, work well under some 
conditions and less well under others, leading us predictably astray, for instance, in 
attempting to play three-card monte. See D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three 
Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender Profiling”: Some Lessons of 
Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 193-210 
(2002). I am inclined to evolutionary explanations for this state of affairs, but this is 
controversial and unnecessary to the present paper. At any rate, our evidence rules and 
practices should attempt to understand these conditions and take them into account. 
 21 Indeed, it resonates closely with many of the points made (in the context of 
a discussion of “conditional relevancy”) in Craig Callen’s fine article, Conditional 
Relevancy and Constrained Resources, supra note 14. Consider, also, the following from 
Professor Allen, discussing the limitations of a pure Bayesian account of proof at trial:  
Whereas under the unconditional probability assumption there are too 
many possible accounts of reality, under the conditioned-on-trial-evidence 
assumption there are too few—none actually. There are none because this 
possibility suffers from an infinite regress of a different sort from the 
unconditional probability assumption. The regress here comes from the fact 
that evidence does not announce its own implications, those implications 
emerge from the effort of human contemplation. 
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concerning the implications of naturalized epistemology in the 
Goldman vein22 applied to evidence law to be found, most 
specifically, in Ronald Allen and Brian Leiter’s important 
article in the Virginia Law Review in 2001,23 though I was also 
moving in something of a similar direction myself somewhat 
earlier.24 
Allen and Leiter adopt the position that proper 
rulemaking in a jury system requires the rulemaker to take 
into account both “the epistemic frailties of jurors, and the 
epistemic limits of rule-appliers [the “gatekeepers”], namely, 
judges.”25 And later in the article they assert that the main 
question to be asked in regard to any rule of inclusion or 
exclusion is “an essentially empirical question: Does this rule of 
inclusion or exclusion in fact increase the likelihood that 
factfinders, given what they are actually like, will achieve 
knowledge about disputed matters of fact?”26 They also appear 
to adopt the primacy of information derived from formal 
empirical studies as the main appropriate source of 
information about those epistemic frailties, rejecting “rootless 
theorizing” as too “a priori.”27 However, it seems to me that 
their approach to the results of such studies, and to other 
sources of relevant knowledge on the advisability of rules and 
  
Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 
613-14 (1994). This emphasis on the “effort of human contemplation,” developed at 
various later points in the article, see, e.g., id. at 619-20, appears to be the same as an 
emphasis, for purposes of relevance analysis, on the state of the humans doing the 
contemplation, i.e., the factfinder(s). 
 22 See generally ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986). 
 23 Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1493-1503 (2001); see also Brian Leiter, The 
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make 
for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814-15 (1997). 
 24 See D. Michael Risinger, supra note 16, at 403, 431-46 (“The Relevance of 
the Irrelevant”) (drawing the distinction between potential and usable relevance):  
[Federal Rule of Evidence 401] declares evidence relevant if it has “any 
tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence” without suggesting a referent to the trier of fact’s 
rational capacities to derive or process the information. It emphasizes the 
content of the code independent of the characteristics of the decoder.  
Id. at 433 n.79; see also D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional 
Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 518-20 
(2000).  
 25 Allen and Leiter, supra note 23, at 1502 (quoting Leiter, supra note 23, at 
814-15). 
 26 Id. at 1537. 
 27 Id. at 1521-26. 
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rule changes, is so cautious that it just about rules out a 
“naturalized” reform agenda. 
The main tool Allen and Leiter use to arrive at this 
position is the “external validity” play, although they don’t use 
that label. Whenever formal data are derived from 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies, even of the best 
designed sorts, there is always an issue of how far the results 
can be generalized to other universes of phenomena beyond the 
exact set studied.28 This question is perhaps trivial in physics, 
because of well-warranted assumptions of fungibility, but as 
such fungibility assumptions become less and less tenable, 
external validity concerns rise, and when we get to issues of 
human behavior, these concerns are at their highest. Allen and 
Leiter rightly recognize that there is always a question in 
generalizing from behavior under simulated test conditions to 
behavior under real world conditions, and that this may be 
especially true when attempting to generalize to behavior 
under the very unusual conditions presented by the context of a 
jury trial. This can be seen as laudable cautious skepticism, 
and I must say that as to each individual proposition 
considered, I can view it that way myself. However, globally, I 
can’t escape the feeling that they have set the bar too high. In 
regard to the reform implications of the demeanor studies, they 
accept the conclusions of Professor Wellborn that these studies 
do not yet compel any specific changes in the current way we 
do business.29 They then turn to two other areas, probabilistic 
evidence and character evidence, which they say “cry out for 
reform and/or additional research.”30 But in the end, after 
looking at the condition of the empirical record and examining 
it through their external validity lens, no suggestions for 
possible reform are forthcoming.31 
Now I concede that I am probably being a bit cranky 
about this. The line between proper circumspection about 
  
 28 The locus classicus for the consideration of the problem (and the source of 
the term) is the work of Donald T. Campbell. The most recent version of this work is to 
be found in WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL 
INFERENCE 83-93 (2002). Reflections on external validity issues in legal contexts can be 
found in Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: 
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 25-28 
(2003) and D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 782-88 (2007). 
 29 Allen & Leiter, supra note 23 at 1540-42. 
 30 Id. at 1542. 
 31 Id. at 1545, 1549. 
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external validity and unreasonable status quo conservatism is 
difficult and hardly self-defining. But I come to this writing 
somewhat bent by watching the likes of Professor Ebbe 
Ebbesen play what I consider to be a radically skeptical version 
of the external validity card to aid various law enforcement 
status quo conservatives in resisting needed eyewitness 
identification reforms.32  
In my view, what is needed for proper “naturalized 
reform” of the law is a combination of formal empirical data 
and critical common sense which can together form the basis 
for wise choices. Common sense in this context refers both to 
the sense of the world that humans obtain through the process 
of lived experience, and to processes of critical evaluation 
available in ordinary reflection and discourse that can be 
brought to bear on both the products of the laboratory and the 
less formal products of the laboratory of life.33 It is commonly 
  
 32 Professor Ebbesen is a social psychologist who teaches at the University of 
California at San Diego. For a long time he has been one of the main prosecution 
witnesses called in litigation across the country to resist the admissibility of testimony 
of eyewitness researchers on the weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony 
under various conditions. He has also been the go-to guy for providing academic 
support for law enforcement resistance to changing the way that eyewitness 
identification procedures are conducted and presented in court. See, e.g., United States 
v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); People v. Smith, 784 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. LeGrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). He seems to 
have been the main design consultant (if it can be called a design) for the Illinois 
eyewitness study, the results of which were the basis of the infamous Mecklenberg 
Report. For a full examination of the many weaknesses of the Mecklenberg Report, see 
generally Daniel Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Identifications in 
the Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2007). This evaluation was the product of a panel 
assembled by John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The members of the panel were 
Daniel Schacter, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University; Robyn Dawes, Queenan 
Distinguished University Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow, American 
Statistical Association; Henry L. Roediger III, James S. McDonnell Distinguished 
University Professor at Washington University, former President, Association for 
Psychological Science; Larry L. Jacoby, Professor at Washington University; Daniel 
Kahneman, Professor of Psychology, Princeton University, 2002 Nobel Laureate in 
Economics; Richard Lempert, Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan School 
of Law, and Division Director for the Social and Economic Sciences at the National 
Science Foundation, 2002-2006; Robert Rosenthal, Distinguished Professor at 
University of California, Riverside, and Pierce Professor of Psychology emeritus, 
Harvard University, Co-Chair Task Force on Statistical Inference, American 
Psychological Association. For another evaluation of the Mecklenberg report, together 
with a description of the kind of reform proposals regularly opposed by Prof. Ebbesen, 
see generally Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A. Dauphinais, and Martin A. Safer, A 
Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807 (2007). 
 33 What I am embracing is a version of what C.S. Peirce referred to as 
“critical common-sensism.” See Christopher Hookway, Critical Common-Sensism and 
Skepticism, 24 NOUS 397 (1990). I am aware of the sizable literature on the notion of 
common sense and its characteristics, strengths and weaknesses, although I must 
admit that I have only scratched its surface. A good set of references, although 
concededly now perhaps a bit dated, appears in Barry Smith, Formal Ontology, 
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observed that common-sense inquiry and scientific inquiry are 
not different in kind,34 and so it would hardly be surprising if a 
program of naturalization would supplement formal data with 
common-sense evaluation, since for most issues of interest for 
purposes of the law, definitive formal data either cannot be 
developed because of limitations on human research, or else 
they must await programs of research stretching into the far 
reaches of the future. Unless we supplement them with 
common sense, we seem doomed to embrace the status quo 
indefinitely.  
In embracing a common sense component to a program 
of naturalization, I am of course not really disagreeing with 
either Professor Allen or Professor Leiter, since they have both 
had positive things to say in the past about the role of common 
sense in things legal and evidential.35 So where might a 
  
Common Sense and Cognitive Science, 43 INT’L J. OF HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 641, 
663-66 (1995); see also LYND FORGUSON, COMMON SENSE (1989).  
 34 See generally SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON (2003), 
especially ch. 4, “The Long Arm of Common Sense.” 
 35 Consider this from Prof. Leiter: 
I find a certain type of pragmatism attractive—indeed, unavoidable—
but it is both more modest and more radical than the apology for fuzziness 
that masquerades as pragmatism in the law journals. This pragmatism is a 
relative of the type one finds in philosophers like Carnap and Quine, and that 
has entered the philosophical lexicon in the metaphor of “Neurath’s boat.” 
The radicalism of this pragmatism resides in its recognition that the only 
possible criteria for the acceptance of epistemic norms—norms about what to 
believe—are pragmatic: we must simply accept the epistemic norms that 
work for us—that help us predict sensory experience, that allow us to 
manipulate and control the environment successfully, that enable us to 
“cope.” Pragmatic criteria are, at the limit, the only possible criteria for the 
acceptance of epistemic norms precisely because we can’t defend our choice of 
any particular epistemic norm on epistemic grounds ad infinitum. At some 
point, we must reach an epistemic norm for which the best we can say is, “it 
works.” 
But which norms actually work for us? Take an example: “Don’t believe 
in a hypothesis that figures in a non-consilient explanation of experience” is a 
norm for belief—call it the “consilience” norm. A non-consilient explanation is 
one that posits an explanans—the thing that does the explaining—that 
seems too narrowly tailored to the explanandum—the event to be explained. 
Here’s how this consilience norm works in our lives. Suppose while sitting at 
home, all the lights in the house suddenly go out at the very same moment. 
What fact about the world explains this? 
Explanatory hypothesis number 1:  
Conspiring leprechauns have simultaneously thrown all the light 
switches in the house.  
By contrast, explanatory hypothesis number 2 proposes that:  
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combination of formal data and common sense insight take us? 
Well, for one thing, I think that it would carry us toward 
supporting most of the reforms in eyewitness procedures that 
have been suggested by Gary Wells and others, perhaps along 
something like the following lines: 
1. There are a larger number of erroneous convictions 
of factually innocent defendants than many believed or were 
willing to admit until recently. (This is supported both by data 
and by an examination of the statements concerning the rarity 
  
There has been a general power failure, i.e., electrical current has 
stopped entering the house.  
Both explanatory hypotheses suppose an ontology: mischievous 
leprechauns on the one hand; electricity, wires, and currents on the other. 
But the appeal to leprechauns is non-consilient: it seems a gratuitous 
ontological posit, precisely because supposing that leprechauns exist doesn’t 
help explain anything else. Their existence doesn’t explain our 
observations—we haven’t seen any—nor does it help explain the restoration 
of power—we neither need to “exterminate” the leprechauns in order to 
retain power, nor do we even need to turn on all the light switches they are 
hypothesized to have flipped. By contrast, assuming the existence of electrical 
currents proves a very fruitful ontological posit: it not only cues us to the 
appropriate steps to take to restore power in the house, but it helps explain a 
range of ordinary phenomena, like why the television goes off when 
unplugged from the socket. Since the consilience norm favors the electricity 
ontology over the leprechaun ontology, and since the former works better 
than the latter, it appears that a good reason to accept the consilience norm 
is because of its practical cash-value. 
Indeed, the consilience norm—and its other relatives in a scientific 
epistemology—have worked very well for us humans: they helped depopulate 
our ontology of leprechauns and gods and ethers, and they are foundational 
norms in scientific practice, a practice that sends the planes into the sky, 
keeps the food from spoiling in the refrigerator, and alleviates human 
suffering through modern medicine. From a philosophical standpoint, what 
bears special notice is that the epistemic norms of common sense and the 
epistemic norms of science are simply on a continuum. 
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 267, 306-08 (1997) (citations omitted). 
  And this from Professor Allen: 
There is plenty of work to be done figuring out how people reason, and 
particularly how they reason about legal affairs, even if we do not pursue 
these matters with the equivalent of highly general, top-down scientific 
theories or the tools of postmodern French literary theory. However, even if 
the fun quotient does go down, the significance quotient may go up. As the 
sociologist Lindenberg said: “Common sense finds its way into a body of law if 
it has a strong influence on social relations; central to all of these is the body 
of law governing evidence . . . . The body of law governing evidence may be 
the strongest bastion against sudden assaults on common sense.” I would add 
that resisting sudden assaults on common sense may be one of the most 
important guarantors of the continuing progression of civilization. 
Ronald J. Allen, Common Sense, Rationality and the Legal Process, 22 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1417, 1430-31 (2001) (citations omitted). 
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of such events over time, which I guess is another form of 
data.36) 
2. Laboratory data suggests that humans are 
vulnerable to a variety of influences that lead to erroneous 
selection of innocent persons as the perpetrators of crime in a 
non-trivial number of cases, generally involving stranger-on-
stranger identifications.37 This result is not particularly 
surprising from a critical common-sense perspective. 
3. Data from other studies indicate that humans tend 
to over-value eyewitness identification,38 especially if 
confidently given, even though confidence is not necessarily a 
good predictor of accuracy under many conditions.39 This result 
also does not appear to be surprising from a critical common 
sense perspective. 
4. Data from other sources (examination of the records 
of DNA exonerations) indicates that erroneous eyewitness 
identification is the single most common factor involved in such 
cases.40 This is also not particularly surprising. 
5. Data from laboratory studies point to ways of 
conducting criminal investigations involving eyewitness 
  
 36 See generally Risinger, supra note 28, at 765-68 et passim. 
 37 The literature on eyewitness identification research and its results is vast. 
A good starting point is Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 (2006). 
 38 See generally R.C.L. Lindsay, Expectations of Eyewitness Performance: 
Jurors’ Verdicts Do Not Follow from Their Beliefs, in ROSS ET AL., ADULT EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY (1994).  
 39 Id.; see also, e.g., Siegfried L. Sporer, Choosing, Confidence and Accuracy: 
A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Studies, 118 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 315 (1995).  
 40 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000) 
(app. 2, tbl. 2, providing an analysis of 62 DNA exoneration cases showing inaccurate 
eyewitness identifications in 84% of the cases); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, 
The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005) 
(analysis of 86 DNA exoneration cases showing inaccurate eyewitness identifications in 
71% of the cases); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78 
(2008) (analysis of 200 DNA exonerations showing inaccurate eyewitness 
identifications in 79% of the cases). The exact implications of these statistics are not 
clear and must be approached with caution. As Roger Park has pointed out, in a set of 
cases proved by DNA to be factually wrong, and made up largely of stranger rape cases, 
the statistic could hardly be otherwise, and taken by itself it is weak evidence that 
eyewitness identifications are especially unreliable. See Roger C. Park, Eyewitness 
Identification: Expert Witnesses Are Not the Only Solution, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 
305, 305-06 (2003). This is of course another variation of the “denominator problem.” 
Without a reference class in which both the number of accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitness identifications is known, it is not possible to derive a rate of inaccuracy. 
However, the DNA data are hardly inconsistent with the general claim that eyewitness 
identifications are surprisingly unreliable, a claim that predates DNA exonerations 
significantly. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 516 (1890), Great 
Books Edition (1952). 
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identifications that significantly reduce the likelihood of 
erroneous identifications of innocent suspects.41 Some of these 
suggestions are, when examined in a critical common sense 
fashion, virtually cost free both as to monetary costs and costs 
in lost identifications of the guilty that are at all epistemically 
defensible to begin with. In such circumstances, such reforms 
should be undertaken.42  
Let me expand on the latter point. What I am referring 
to is the adoption of a requirement that all pre-trial 
identification procedures (photo-spreads and corporeal line-
ups) be administered by someone who does not know which 
person in the array is the suspect and which is a filler, that is, 
the so-called “double blind”43 administration of the 
identification procedure. While it is possible to argue that other 
proposed reforms (such as sequential viewing to reduce 
selection by “relative judgment”) may have a cost in reducing 
some epistemically warranted accurate identifications, such an 
effect is not possible in regard to the masking of 
administrators. No one has yet come up with an argument that 
plausibly suggests how it could be that identifications which 
result solely from the administrator cueing, whether conscious 
or unconscious, and which would not be made by the witness 
independent of this variable, have any epistemic justification at 
  
 41 See Wells, supra note 37. 
 42 The presentation in the text should not be read to mean that I do not think 
that other aspects of the reform proposals should not be adopted. I selected the double 
blind aspect as the easiest to use as a clear illustration. Beyond that, for instance, I 
believe that a strong case can be made for adopting sequential presentation, even 
though the loss of selections which results from a sequential presentation can be more 
easily argued to represent the loss of a certain percentage of epistemically justified 
“accurate” identifications of true perpetrators. The set of identifications lost at the 
margin between simultaneous presentation procedures and sequential procedures is 
not large, and is likely to be rich in non-perpetrator selections, or false positives. The 
ratio of lost true positives to lost false identifications seems likely to be small enough to 
count as an acceptable cost for the reduction in innocents convicted under virtually any 
justifiable approach to such a “reform ratio.” See the discussion in Risinger, supra note 
28, at 796-97.  
 43 This terminology is adopted by virtue of an analogy to “double blind” study 
design in various research contexts. In a double blind study, the test subjects do not 
know if the “treatment” they are subjected to is the actual test variable or a placebo 
(single blind) and the people interacting with the test subjects in the administration of 
the test do not know either (double blind). The term “double blind” in the eyewitness 
context is a bit out of kilter, since the notion of the original blind (the fact that the 
witness does not know specifically which person is the actual suspect) is entailed in the 
notion of a line-up style procedure (whether photo or corporeal) to begin with, so it 
seems in some ways that the term “blind administration” would be more natural in 
capturing the proposed reform, but “double blind administration” has become fairly 
standard in the literature. 
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all. To so argue is akin to arguing that we would be justified in 
retaining and not reforming a coin-flipping process in making 
selections from line-ups, because otherwise we would lose the 
one in X number of identifications that was coincidentally 
accurate. And all logistical and cost objections to blind 
administration have easy technological responses that render 
the objections trivial at best.44 So a combination of formal data 
about both the human circumstances that generate misleading 
evidence for use and trial, and juror inability to properly 
discount such misleading evidence once it reaches them, 
together with common sense evaluation of objections to reform, 
should lead to both mandated pre-trial procedures, and rules of 
exclusion45 to enforce the use of those procedures, all based on 
“naturalized reform” principles.  
I could go on giving examples, but I won’t. In any case, I 
hope to have gone some way toward establishing that only by 
utilizing both formal data and critical common sense can a 
naturalized approach to rules of exclusion (and the proof 
process more generally) be of use in improving the product of 
adjudication. 
  
 44 See Letter of John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, 
transmitting new statewide line-up identification guidelines to all New Jersey law 
enforcement agencies 2 (April 18, 2001), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/ 
agguide/photoid.pdf (requiring blind administration where practicable, and 
recommending use of “[t]echnological tools, such as computer programs that can run 
photo lineups and record witness identification independent of the presence of an 
investigator”).  
 45 A reader might object that I had gotten away from the specific subject of 
exclusionary rules by using an example of reform up-stream from the trial. However, I 
have intentionally done this, for a number of reasons. First, in my opinion, if partisan 
adversary presentation and argument at the trial can be argued to add epistemic 
strength to the results of our trial system, the major epistemic weaknesses of our 
current adversary arrangements are the result of party control of the investigation and 
development of information for trial. Party interests being what they are, every 
opportunity for advantageous selection, distortion and massage is likely to be taken. 
The most pressing needs for reform are at this stage, to insure that information is both 
complete and as undistorted and uncorrupted as possible. Once we determine what 
processes should be mandated to this end, then rules of exclusion at trial (evidence 
rules stricti juris) must then be put in place to protect the requirement of the mandated 
pre-trial processes—proper manifestations of the best kind of best evidence principle 
embraced by Professor Nance. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA 
L. REV. 227 (1988) for Professor Nance’s classic revitalization of the “best evidence” 
concept.  
